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A	modern	‘Rasputin’,	or	the	UK’s	‘Vice-Premier’?
Whichever	view	you	take,	Cummings’s	role	is
unprecedented
In	the	Dominic	Cummings	row,	developments	are	not	only	unprecedent	because	they	concern	an
unelected	adviser	but	also	because	they	are	impacting	on	the	country’s	ability	to	deal	with	the	health
and	financial	crises.	This	scandal	is	thus	affecting	lives	and	livelihoods,	argues	Patrick	Dunleavy.
Dominic	Cummings	set	out	to	be,	and	has	certainly	become,	a	sharply	polarizing	force	in	British
politics.	After	his	COVID-19	travel	debacles,	much	of	the	country	takes	a	fiercely	hostile	view	of	his
immanent	sense	of	privilege,	including	but	not	restricted	to	his	many	anti-Brexit	opponents.	For	them,	Cummings	is
a	Rasputin-like	figure,	a	sinister	and	shadowy	influencer	with	a	mysterious	hold	over	a	dazed	and	confused	Boris
Johnson	(the	Tsar	in	this	version)	and	his	scheming	adjunct	(Cummings’s	first	and	most	committed	sponsor,
Michael	Gove).
Like	Rasputin,	Cummings	picks	gratuitous	fights	with	all	around	him,	insults	every	established	elite,	briefs
relentlessly	against	his	enemies,	is	unworried	at	being	pervasively	loathed,	and	is	completely	convinced	of	his
untouchability	because	of	his	hold	over	the	PM.	In	a	developed	form,	some	versions	of	this	view	take	Cummings	as
an	embodiment	of	many	malignant	dark	forces	on	the	right,	pushing	for	an	unrestrained	populist	assault	on	any
constitutional	element	force	constraining	No.10’s	privatizing	freedom	of	action.
Almost	as	extreme	in	a	different	way,	however,	is	the	view	amongst	some	Conservatives,	all	Johnson-regime
loyalists,	and	the	far-right	neo-liberal	think	tanks	and	pressure	groups,	that	Cummings	must	somehow	be	defended
at	all	costs	because	of	his	critical	importance	for	the	current	government.	In	this	perspective,	his	role	is	akin	to	that
of	Vice-Premier,	providing	a	Dick	Cheney-like	Brexiteer	and	free	marketerr	spine	for	an	otherwise	out-of-his-depth
PM.	The	25	May	press	conference	in	the	10	Downing	Street	Rose	Garden,	with	Cummings	scripting	and	delivering
his	own	defence,	gave	enormous	substance	to	this	VP	role,	affording	him	a	prominence,	prestige,	and	official
backing	never	before	given	to	any	cabinet	minister	in	trouble	of	this	kind.	There	is	no	UK	constitutional	role	for	‘the
PM’s	chief	aide’,	nor	are	there	any	established	political	mechanisms	for	holding	such	a	‘Vice-Premier’	to	account.
The	fact	that	Cummings	evinced	absolutely	no	regret	and	gave	no	apologies	for	his	overtly	lockdown-breaking
behaviour	has	already	occasioned	a	lot	of	comment.	But	in	addition,	he	deliberately	garlanded	his	account	of	his
actions	with	many	details	that	signalled	‘unreliable	narrator’	as	clearly	as	any	postmodernist	novel	–	such	as	testing
his	potentially	problematic	eyesight	by	driving	60	miles	to	a	beauty	spot;	and	portraying	his	initial	midnight	dash	to
Durham	as	the	actions	of	a	man	alone,	without	resources,	friendless	in	London,	and	on	his	last	possible	throw	to
save	his	family.
How	ministerial	resignations	are	different
Compare	all	this	with	the	accepted	playbook	of	ministerial	resignations	charted	by	Keith	Dowding	and	his	co-
authors	in	Accounting	for	Ministers.	Using	detailed	statistical	analysis	and	a	comprehensive	survey	of	cases,	they
showed	that	a	minister	who	got	into	trouble	was	normally	left	to	fight	their	corner	alone	at	first,	with	the	PM	and	10
Downing	Street	referring	critics	to	the	minister’s	explanation	of	their	behaviour,	while	conspicuously	omitting	to
pledge	anything	like	full	support	or	confidence	in	them.	After	a	few	days,	media	attention	would	either	subside
because	the	story	had	no	legs,	or	be	kicked	into	the	short	grass	of	a	Cabinet	Secretary	inquiry,	or	the	minister
would	respond	to	support	in	their	party	crumbling	away	–	penning	protestations	of	loyalty	to	the	PM	in	their	letter	of
resignation,	reaffirming	their	innocence	but	leaving	so	that	their	conduct	should	not	displace	the	story	of	the
government’s	successes	further	from	public	view.
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Dowding	et	al	demonstrated	that	such	‘grasping	the	revolver’	moments	tended	to	coincide	spookily	with	polling
evidence	that	the	minister’s	alleged	misdeeds	were	imperiling	public	support	for	the	PM	or	the	government,
following	which	No	10	statements	would	communicate	a	certain	impersonal	coolness	and	detachment,	until	the
minister	took	the	hint	to	go.	Similarly,	where	an	investigation	had	been	triggered	and	misconduct	allegations	even
partially	confirmed,	the	minister	got	no	second	chance	to	state	their	case	–	merely	the	intimation	that	it	is	better	to
resign	first	than	be	sacked.	In	a	jostling	cabinet	of	23,	with	many	more	junior	ministers	knocking	on	the	door,	plenty
of	rivals	are	usually	prepared	to	help	No	10	brief	against	a	black	sheep	minister	who	resists	pressure	to	go.	And
replacing	the	culprit	once	gone	rarely	causes	any	lasting	inconvenience	to	a	Prime	Minister.
Yet	now,	apparently,	Cummings	is	sui	generis.	He	has	no	rivals	or	possible	replacements	as	the	Svengali	of
Downing	Street.	Instead	many	compliant	hapless	senior	ministers	obediently	rushed	to	tweet	whatever	they	are	told
to	do	at	the	behest	of	the	PM’s	chief	aide,	even	when	ignorant	of	much	about	the	situation.	This	is	an	Armando
Iannucci	playbook	straight	out	of	his	‘The	Thick	of	It’,	which	increasingly	reads	as	the	go-to	manual	for	anyone
wanting	to	understand	the	Johnson-Cummings	regime.	In	the	process,	most	of	the	cabinet	seem	to	have
succeeded	only	in	publicly	identifying	themselves	as	‘meat	in	the	room’	–	a	phrase	made	famous	in	another
Iannucci	classic,	describing	people	whose	role	was	just	to	pad	out	the	table	at	big	meetings	and	repeat	the	regime
line	in	public.
Sometimes	ministers	do	survive	potential	resignation	scandals.	When	Culture	Secretary	in	2012,	Jeremy	Hunt	was
in	charge	of	deciding	whether	to	allow	the	News	Corporation	takeover	of	BSkyB,	which	Murdoch	was	desperate	to
do	at	the	time.	During	this	period,	Adam	Smith,	an	advisor	in	Hunt’s	office,	sent	hundreds	of	emails	to	NewsCorp’s
media	liaison	section,	apparently	a	flagrant	breach	of	Hunt’s	quasi-judicial	role	in	this	decision.	An	inquiry	later
whitewashed	Hunt,	who	apparently	knew	nothing	of	his	aide’s	activities.	Against	the	odds,	Hunt	survived	to	become
a	long-lasting	Health	Secretary	and	eventual	challenger	to	Johnson	for	the	Tory	leadership	in	2019	–	keeping	his
copybook	conspicuously	clean	of	further	blots	along	the	way.
The	looming	context
What	makes	the	Cummings	case	so	different	too,	is	the	unprecedented	salience	of	his	controversial	behaviours.
The	UK	has	suffered	a	huge	coronavirus	disruption	for	weeks,	and	lost	more	than	60,000	people	to	the	virus.	The
explanation	of	what	has	gone	so	catastrophically	wrong	so	quickly,	and	which	will	affect	the	economy	and	public
finances	for	at	least	a	decade	ahead,	is	still	emerging.	But	it	seems	safe	to	say	an	ongoing	omni-crisis	has	been
created	at	many	levels:
An	initial	and	wholly	familiar	UK	core	executive	policy	disaster	where	the	Johnson-Cummings	regime	from
January	to	late	March	minimized	the	coming	threat	and	gratuitously	delayed	taking	action,	partly	while
believing	in	Cummings’s	alleged	dalliance	with	‘herd	immunity’	solutions.
A	public	service	delivery	disaster	that	was	unplanned	and	unintended.	An	austerity-vulnerable	and	hopelessly
under-equipped	NHS	was	‘protected’	only	by	repelling	many	cases	from	hospitals,	and	leaving	the	social	care
sector	to	completely	fend	for	itself	in	caring	for	the	very	elderly.
Structural	failures	built	into	the	public	services	by	a	decade	of	Cameron-Clegg-May	austerity,	the	failure	to
undertake	any	other	remedial	policy	changes	during	the	Brexit	era	(2016-19),	and	the	withering	away	of	local
government	and	public	health	capabilities.
A	second	core	executive	policy	fiasco	in	the	ludicrous	over-centralization	of	coronavirus	crisis	management
efforts	in	No	10,	with	Cummings’s	cronies	and	associates	brought	in	from	the	private	sector,	which	has
created	huge	problems.	The	established	bureaucracies	in	the	civil	service	have	produced	substantial	and
reasonably	well-working	initiatives,	like	the	Treasury/HMRC’s	furlough	scheme	and	aid	to	the	self-employed,
and	DWP’s	massive	expansion	of	job-seeker	benefits.	All	three	massive	policy	initiatives	were	successfully
implemented	at	speed.	In	acute	contrast,	Cummings	and	his	Downing	Street	‘irregulars’,	feuding	non-stop	with
the	shattered	post-Lansley/post-Hunt	Department	of	Health,	have	produced	only	a	series	of	feeble,	late,	non-
working	initiatives	–	the	Dyson	ventilators,	the	defective	PPE	flown	in	from	Turkey,	the	‘NHS	volunteers’
recruited	and	left	untasked	in	their	tens	of	thousands,	the	contact-tracing	app	that	does	not	work.	Many	No	10
efforts	seem	to	have	gone	solely	into	dreaming	up	bogus,	one-day	‘good	news’	stories	for	limping	ministerial
briefings	–	a	kind	of	‘crisis	management	by	think	tank’	strategy.
A	third	level	of	core	executive	policy	fiasco	has	now	been	added	by	the	decision	to	bulldoze	past	the
Cummings	scandal,	whatever	the	cost	to	public	trust,	and	the	wider	mismanagement	of	easing	lockdown
messages	by	a	health-impaired	Johnson.
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Normally,	the	costs	of	blatant	misconduct	within	the	core	executive	are	exclusively	political	and	occasionally
administrative:	a	blow	to	government	popularity,	a	short	downward	blip	in	a	Whitehall	department’s	performance,	or
another	dent	in	public	trust	in	government.	The	possible	costs	of	the	Cummings	scandal,	and	of	Johnson’s	decision
to	brazen	his	way	through	it,	are	again	historically	unique	–	for	they	could	yet	be	counted	in	terms	of	more	body
bags	and	an	even	more	shattered	economy	in	the	weeks	ahead,	and	in	the	autumn	and	winter	to	come.
_________________
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